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MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
A CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR
Mississippi's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
PROMOTING THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Stephen R. Miller* and Larry T. Richardson**
I. INTRODUCTION - SCOPE OF ARTICLE - APPLICATION TO MIssisswI
"[I]mpartiality or objectivity is the polar star to guide tribunals
on their courses of administering justice."' In administrative hear-
ings, no less than in judicial proceedings, the tribunal's objectivi-
ty must be both real and perceived.' Neutrality of the hearing
officer has been described as one of the two irreducible elements
of due process of law.'
The institution of the administrative hearing has no proud
heritage in Mississippi. Two major problems diminish the fair-
ness of administrative justice. First, administrative agencies must
exercise the combined functions of investigator, prosecutor and
judge, creating an inherent conflict of interests. This practice com-
promises the objectivity of the administrative inquiry, favoring
the interests of the agency. Although combination of functions
is the most obvious source of bias in administrative hearings, the
scheme has been blessed by both the Mississippi and U. S.
Supreme Courts.' Probably no litigant ever approached an ad-
ministrative hearing where the prosecutorial and judicial func-
tions were combined without wondering how an agency could
fairly decide a claim against itself.
Many agencies do try to separate the functions of prosecutor
and judge by assigning separate staff to fulfill these roles.
*B.S., Ball State University, 1973; M.B.A., University of Mississippi, 1974; J.D., University of Missis-
sippi, 1979.
**B.A., Mississippi State University, 1972; J.D., Mississippi College, 1979; M.P.P.A., Mississippi State
University, 1981.
1. 111. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Town of Goodman, 252 Miss. 297, 314, 173 So. 2d 116, 124 (1965) ("Absolute
objectivity as yet is unobtainable by human beings, but the closer approximation thereof is the Legal Holy Grail
for which earnest tribunals must eternally seek."). Id. Cf. Eidt v. City of Natchez, 421 So. 2d 1225, 1232
(Miss. 1982) (finding that any decision of any administrative board or agency must be based upon substantial
evidence appearing in the record).
2. Silas, Eight States Set Pace in Setting Up Independent Adninistrative Law Panels, A.B.A. J., July 1985,
at 18.
3. Eidt v. City of Natchez, 421 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Miss. 1982).
4. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); McCaffery's Food Market v. Miss. Milk Comm'n, 227 So.
2d 459 (Miss. 1969); Ex Parte Fritz, 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722 (1905). Combination of functions is discussed
in K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 13.01-.08 (1972).
SPRING 1986 NUMBER 1IVOLUME 6
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
However, in spite of separation of duties within an agency, the
staff may have a tendency to pull together as a unit. Even if they
have a clear concept that their mission is separate, they may sub-
consciously tend to work in concert. Regardless of how the agency
staff thinks or acts, the public perception will always be that the
hearing officer is biased. The perception that in-house hearing
officers are biased toward their agency is a chilling factor which
discourages potential claimants and casts doubt on even those de-
cisions that are correctly decided in favor of the agency.' The ap-
pearance of favoritism must be avoided.
Second, the hearings are often inartfully conducted, fostering
decisions which may be unfair to either side. This is particularly
a problem in Mississippi, where there is a proliferation of state
agencies.' If the state had fewer and larger agencies, there would
be economies of scale and increased opportunities for hearing
officer specialization. Since there are presently many small agen-
cies in Mississippi, few of these have a need for full-time hear-
ing officers, and many agencies rely on non-specialists to conduct
their hearings.8 Mississippi case law generally promotes fair hear-
ings. The factors which detract from the fairness of administra-
tive hearings are the structure and procedure of the agencies
hearing the cases. The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized
that even though administrative agencies are not restricted by the
technical or formal rules governing trials before a court, they
should observe the elementary and fundamental principles of a
judicial inquiry in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial pow-
ers.9 Although the court is not likely to let an unjust result stand,
the problem remains that a very high percentage of administra-
tive decisions are not appealed and therefore receive no sophisti-
cated supervision.
Mississippi law establishes numerous rights and interests which
the state (acting through its executive agencies) may not adverse-
5. Levinson, The Central Panel System: A Framework That Separates ALl's From Administrative Agen-
cies, 65 JUDICATURE 236, 243 (1981-82).
6. See, e.g., Britton v. Koontz First Nat'l Bank, 285 So. 2d 181 (Miss. 1973) (opponent to bank charter
not permitted to cross-examine bank examiner); Real Estate Comm'n v. Ryan, 248 So. 2d 790 (Miss. 1971)
(process not served on licensee; license revoked without substantial evidence).
7. For a list of Mississippi administration agencies, see MISSISSIPPI OFFICIAL AND STATISTICAL REGISTER
1984-1988 (Sec. of State 1985).
8. State Department of Rehabilitation Services, MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-33-153 (Supp. 1986); State Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-1-1 (Supp. 1986); Mississippi Employment Security Commis-
sion, MIss. CODE ANN. § 71-5-101 (1972). These agencies have statutory hearing officer positions with
non-professional hearing officers. In addition, some agency governing boards conduct their own hearings (e.g.,
the Real Estate Commission, the Board of Medical Licensure, and, the Board of Nursing). For the most part,
such boards are composed of members of the regulated profession who are not trained in fair hearing procedures.
9. Love v. State Bd. of Veterinary Examiners, 230 Miss. 222, 230, 92 So. 2d 463, 467 (1956).
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ly affect prior to an administrative hearing." The legislature's
choice of the administrative hearing as the means to protect those
rights demonstrates its importance. Although there is a wide var-
iety in the kinds of rights involved, there can be no variation in
the quality of due process of law. The hearing must be conducted
in a manner that effectively provides due process.11
As contrasted with proceedings in courts of law, the actual hear-
ing held before an administrative law judge is the critical phase.
Neither the full panoply of discovery procedures nor the Missis-
sippi Rules of Evidence are available for use before administra-
tive boards.12 The record made before an administrative tribunal
is reviewable in a court of general jurisdiction," ordinarily the
circuit court. The purpose of such hearings is to prevent adminis-
trative error: the petitioner is given an opportunity to show the
state that an otherwise legal exercise of power is improper be-
cause it is predicated upon an error of fact.1" The question arises:
In what kind of forum can these important rights best be protected?
Under our common law, administrative agencies can act upon
information gained in their own investigations, but "where a hear-
ing is required by law, . . . adjudication must be based upon evi-
dence adduced at the hearing and not upon secret knowledge of
the agency." IS If a report of the agency is to be considered as evi-
dence, it must be introduced as part of the record.6
10. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-9-127 (Supp. 1986) (citing prerequisites to dismissal or action ad-
versely affecting compensation or employment status of state personnel and exceptions thereto); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 37-9-109 (Supp. 1986) (citing the rights of a school district employee who has received written notice
of a determination not to offer a senewai contract for a successive year); Miss. CoDx ANs-. S 4V1-1-19 (Supp.
1986) (citing the procedures pertinent to the denial, suspension or revocation of licenses for birthing centers);
Miss. Coo ANN. § 47-7-27 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (delineating the authority of the State Parole Board to effect
the return of a paroled offender, the arrest of a parolee or the revocation of parole); MIsS. CooE ANN. § 57-5-11
(1972 & Supp. 1986) (delineating the authority of the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board in issuing
certificates of public convenience and necessity and empowering the board to hold hearings and make such
investigations as may be desired); Miss. CODE ANN. § 61-1-35 (1972) (delineating the authority of the Missis-
sippi Aeronautics Commission to hold investigations, inquiries and hearings); Miss. CODS ANN. § 81-13-1(5)-
(7) (Supp. 1986) (delineating the procedures to be followed when an applicant for a credit union charter is
denied by the Credit Union Board).
11. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Merchant v. Board of Trustees, 492 So. 2d 959, 964 (1986) ("When hearing teacher dismis-
sal matters, school boards proceed informally and are not bound by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence."). Id.;
Hancock Bank v. Gaddy, 328 So. 2d 361, 364 (1976). ("The full panoply of pleadings and processes for dis-
covery provided for full-fledged litigants in law and equity courts is not available for use before an administra-
tive board."). Id.
13. State Board of Psychological Examiners v. Coxe, 355 So. 2d 669, 671 (Miss. 1978).
14. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-69 (1970); Little v. City of Jackson, 375 So. 2d 1031, 1035
(Miss. 1979) (enumerating procedural safeguards designed to minimize the risk of error attending the removal
of municipal civil service employees).
15. Britton and Koontz Nat'l Bank v. Biglane, 285 So. 2d 181, 185 (Miss. 1973), Banking Board granted
a charter based in part upon report of the Comptroller of Banking. The report was given to the opponents
of the charter at the outset of the hearing, but they were denied the right to cross-examine the field examiner
who made the examination for the Comptroller. Id.
16. Id. at 185.
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Mississippi, like a number of other states, has adopted legisla-
tion based on the Model State Administrative Procedures Act. Our
present law is an abbreviated version of the 1961 Model Act. 7
Although this abbreviated version is silent on ex parte consulta-
tions, adjudicative hearings, records, rules of evidence in con-
tested cases, and separation of functions, we are not advocating
the adoption of more detailed procedural protections. The most
detailed of procedural protections are rendered useless if a citizen
stands before a biased tribunal. Unfortunately, this institutional
bias is the most neglected problem in administrative reform efforts.
Nine states have taken the initiative and created a central panel
system of administrative law judges."6 This innovative concept
was incorporated in the 1981 Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act.' This article will focus on the salient features of the
central panel system and the 1981 Model Act.
II. THE CENTRAL PANEL ALTERNATIVE
A "central panel" of administrative law judges0 is a free-standing
agency whose mission is to hear and decide certain contested mat-
ters of administrative law. Its distinctive feature is that its hear-
ing officers are not employed by the agencies whose actions they
review.' The creation of a central panel would detach the ad-
judicatory function from agencies that have enforcement powers,
removing the most obvious source of bias. Administrative law
judges would clearly have no interest in the outcome of the cases
they hear.
This solution must be a legislative one. " For decades, there
has been a call upon the Congress to exercise its constitutional
17. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-43-1 to -19 (Supp. 1986).
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11370.2(a) (West Supp. 1986) (creates an Office of Administrative Hearings in
the Department of General Services); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001(1) (1982) (creates a Division of Hear-
ing Officers in the Department of Administration); FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (West 1982) (creates a Division of
Administrative Hearings within the Department of Administration); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 7 § 4H (Michie/Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1986) (creates a Division of Administrative Law Appeals within the administration and finance
executive office); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West Supp. 1986) (creates Office of Administrative Hearings);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52-14F-1 (West 1986) (creates Office of Administrative Law within Department of State,
which is independent of any supervision or control by the department); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (Supp.
1985) (creates the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent, quasi-judicial agency); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-5-321(a) (Supp. 1986) (creates Administrative Procedures Division in the Office of the Secretary
of State); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. % 34.12.010 (Supp. 1986) (creates an independent Office of Administrative
Hearings).
19. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-301 (1981) (creates an office of administrative
hearings to employ a central panel of administrative law judges).
20. We use the terms administrative law judge and hearing officer to refer to the employee who presides
at the hearing. The 1981 Model Act uses the term "administrative law judge," and the states use a variety of terms.
21. Rich, Central Panels of Administrative Law Judges: An Introduction, 65 JUDICATURE 233, 234 (1981).
22. Kelly v. Miss. Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 876-77 (Miss. 1981) (courts cannot make structural
changes-proper function of legislature).
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power under Article III to create a federal administrative court
to decide administrative law issues. " Such a separation would al-
low agencies to do that which they do best-make policy and prose-
cute violators. The arguments on this topic relating to the federal
government are applicable to state governments.
The Mississippi Legislature has constitutional authority to cre-
ate and abolish inferior courts.2" But rather than the creation of
a new court, we propose the adoption of a central panel system
of administrative law judges - a separate administrative agency -
that would ensure that due process of law is afforded in contested
administrative proceedings.2 Of the two approaches, the central
panel makes better sense for Mississippi. Creation of the central
panel is an easy, preliminary step toward the consolidation of the
excessive number of executive agencies in Mississippi."' An ad-
ministrative court is a judicial, rather than executive entity, which
could not have the flexibility and scope of authority needed to
address the problems raised herein.
A central panel of hearing officers would promote economy
and efficiency in the administrative process in many ways:
- The central panel would create career ladders for hearing
officers, insuring an orderly supply of well-trained adminis-
trative law judges.
- The resources of the corps of hearing officers would not
be wasted, increasing the caseload that each hearing officer
could handle. Hearing officers would receive proper staff
support.
- Those cases which are currently heard by a full commis-
sion or board could be heard more cheaply by a single hear-
ing officer.
- A central panel could adopt uniform rules of evidence and
procedure, helping to ensure that all hearings are conducted
fairly. Uniform rules would also aid the bar and reviewing
courts.
- Public confidence in the administrative process would be
enhanced.
- The number and cost of appeals to circuit and chancery
courts would be reduced.
23. For a history of these efforts, see Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Com-
missions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960) ("Administrative agencies are long on judicial form, short on judicial sub-
stance."). Id. at 931.
24. Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 172.
25. Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States, 65 JUDICATURE 246 (1981).
26. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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- The central panel would be an information source for the
legislature on state of the art. "7
II1. QUALIFICATIONS OF DIRECTOR AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES
Although the qualifications of the central panel director 8 and
administrative law judges vary among the central panel states,
all of these states require legal or administrative procedure
experience. Membership in the state bar is the most common
qualification imposed upon administrative law judges. All but two
of the central panel states require administrative law judges to
be members of the state bars, and several impose additional qualifi-
cations. 9
The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides
an option of requiring the administrative law judge to be admit-
ted to practice law in the state or in a jurisdiction in the United
States." This option should be adopted as the minimum qualifi-
cation for administrative law judges. One of the goals of estab-
lishing a central panel system is to have a cadre of professional
administrative law judges able to conduct any type of hearing.
Attorneys are specially qualified by training and experience in
the application of law to facts, examination of witnesses, deter-
mination of evidentiary questions, and the essentials of a com-
plete and fair hearing. The value of legal knowledge and training
has been recognized by the Mississippi State Personnel Board.
The personnel board's minimum qualification for employee ap-
peals board hearing officers is a license to practice law in Missis-
sippi?1 The central panel office should be empowered to establish
additional qualifications and standards for the evaluation, train-
27. The panel would gain a state-wide perspective of the hearings process without the bias of the agencies
under its jurisdiction and would be in a position to inform the legislature if there are "problem" agencies. The
panel would thereby serve as a check on other executive branch agencies. The panel would be an easily-managed
cost center or program area for the state budget office.
28. The central panel director is the chief administrative law judge. He has additional duties which may
include appointing administrative law judges, assigning cases for hearing, budgeting, staffing the office and
developing personnel policies.
29. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11502 (West Supp. 1986) (requiring that each administrative law judge shall have
been admitted to practice law for at least five years immediately preceeding appointment); COLO. Rav. STAT.
§ 24-30-1003(2) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65(2) (West 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7 § 4H (Michie/Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West Supp. 1986) (not expressly requiring membership
in state bar association); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-752 (Supp. 1985) (determining seniority according to date
of admission to practice law in the General Court of Justice); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5(l) (West 1986)
(requiring attorneys at law or those qualified in administrative law); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(1) (1985
& Supp. 1986); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 34.12.030 (Supp. 1986) (requiring a demonstrated knowledge
of administrative law and procedures).
30. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-301(b) (1981).
31. Classification and Compensation Division, Miss. State Personnel Board, Occupational Codes 7871 and
7873 (1986) (Employee Appeals Board Chief Hearings Officer and Employee Appeals Board Hearings Officer,
respectively).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CENTRAL PANEL
ing and promotion of administrative law judges as provided for
in the Model Act. 2
The central panel would be organized so that each hearing officer
would hear cases from a few certain agencies. Hearing officers
would be classified in grades, with less experienced hearing
officers handling less complex cases. Hearing officers would
receive training in evidence, fair hearing and related topics. More
experienced hearing officers would hear several types of cases.
This kind of organization is in contrast to the current system, in
which employees presiding at hearings are often untrained in ad-
ministrative or legal procedure.3" Training, if done at all, is limited
to learning the specialized substantive law affecting a particular
agency.
IV. APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
In establishing a central panel, one of the more important con-
siderations would be the method of appointment of the central
panel's staff. The independence of the central panel, engendered
by its organizational separation from the agencies, must be bol-
stered by excluding the agencies from the appointment process.
Generally, in the central panel states, the governor appoints the
director subject to senate confirmation." The director appoints
the administrative law judges in at least four of these states. Under
the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, the gover-
nor appoints the director who, in turn, is empowered to appoint
the administrative law judges. 6 Senate confirmation of the direc-
tor is optional.3 7 Mississippi should adopt the method of appoint-
ment outlined in the Model Act and enacted by a majority of the
central panel states. The governor should appoint the director sub-
32. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-301(e) (1981).
33. See supra note 8.
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11370.2(b) (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65(1) (West 1982) (direc-
tor appointed by the Administrative Conmission which is composed of the governor and his cabinet); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 7 § 4H (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (appointed by the secretary of the executive office
for administration and finance with the approval of the governor); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West Supp.
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-752 (Supp. 1985) (appointed by the attorney general); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:14F-3 (West Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010 (Supp. 1986).
35. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11370.3 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1003(1) (1982); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 120.65(2) (West 1982) (stating that "[tihe division shall employ full-time hearing officers to
conduct hearings."); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7 § 4H (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) ("the chief administra-
tive magistrate ... may employ such persons .. .including administrative magistrates . . . ."); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-752 (Supp. 1985) (suggesting appointment by director by expressly stating that "Ithe first chief
hearing officer shall be appointed as soon as practicable."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-4 (West 1986) (ap-
pointed by the governor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-321(2) (Supp. 1986) (establishing "a pool of administrative
judges and hearing officers."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.030 (Supp. 1986).
36. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-301(a) & (b) (1981) (stating that the office shall
employ administrative law judges).
37. Id. at § 4-301(a).
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ject to senate confirmation.38 Once confirmed by the state senate,
the director should be removable only for good cause.
To further insulate the director from political pressure, his term
should be noncoterminous with the term of the governor. Five
states give the director a term longer than that of the appointing
governor. 9 The statute establishing the central panel should pro-
vide that the governor shall appoint a director (chief administra-
tive law judge) for a six-year term, and any successor should be
provided a full six-year term in his own right. Administrative law
judges and all other employees should be appointed by the direc-
tor and be given full civil service protection.
At the outset at least, the central panel should be given authority
and funds to contract for additional hearing officers as needed.
Depending upon the scope of the central panel's jurisdiction as
set by its enabling act, certain hearing officers from existing agen-
cies should be transferred to the panel, making up its initial com-
plement of hearing officers. A transfer of positions and funds
would reduce start-up costs and ensure that the establishment of
the central panel would be a cost-saving measure for the state.
V. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A major consideration would be the extent of the panel's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, which would be established by statute.
All cases should be heard de novo. The central panel should
require proof by a preponderance of the evidence except in cases
involving penalties."°
Hearing officers organized in a central panel would hear cases
as assigned by the chief hearing officer. 'Upon creation of a cen-
tral panel, a straightforward test for including cases in the panel's
jurisdiction will be needed. The primary test for inclusion should
be that where statutes provide that an agency has executive authori-
ty to administer, execute, implement, and enforce the law, and
also has authority to provide a quasi-judicial review over the en-
forcement or implementation, review should be made by the cen-
tral panel. There are scores of such reviews provided for in
38. MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-1-35 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (requires the advice and consent of the state senate
for the appointment of officers). The governor's appointment power provides him with executive authority com-
mensurate with his responsibility to see that laws are faithfully executed.
39. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 1151(3)(A) (1964 & Supp. 1986) (seven years); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.48 (Supp. 1986) (six years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 621.015 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (six years); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:14F-3 (1986) (six years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010 (Supp. 1986) (five years).
40. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966).
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Mississippi statutes. 1 We recommend that the panel be given juris-
diction over all of these.
A second reason for establishing the panel would be to provide
a forum for the efficient, fair, and speedy resolution of adminis-
trative law questions. For example, the central panel would be
the logical body to hear tort claims against the state."2 We do not
envision that the central panel in Mississippi would be assigned
any jurisdiction over ratemaking or rulemaking cases, but that
it would be assigned to hear "contested cases" within that mean-
ing of the term found in the Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act" and the Mississippi statutes."
Once such a panel is established, jurisdiction could be assigned
to it for other reasons. A category of such cases would be those
cases in which state agencies are authorized by statute to invoke
fines or penalties." An efficient and expedient review of the fine
could be had before the central panel. In such cases, the agency
invoking the fine could concentrate its energies on prosecuting
the penalty, without involving itself in the balancing act of provid-
ing a fair hearing while advocating the penalty.
The adoption of a central panel would not perfect the adminis-
trative process of adjudication. But a carefully structured central
panel would have tremendous advantages over our current sys-
tem, both in reduced cost of adjudication and in improved fair-
ness of the decisions rendered.
41. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-19-337 (Supp. 1986) (Board of Review of State Tax Commission's
hearing on assessment for license taxes, permit fees, or license tags); MIss. CODE ANN. § 29-7-17 (Supp.
1986) (Department of Natural Resources' hearing on its assessment of penalties for unauthorized use of miner-
als on state-owned land); Miss. Coo ANN. § 41-7-197 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (Health Care Commission's hear-
ing on its denial of certificate of need for health cart facility); Miss. CoDE ANN. % 41-75-1l (Supp. t986)
(Health Care Commission's hearing on denial of license for ambulatory surgical facilities); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 53-1-47 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (Oil and Gas Board's hearing on assessment of penalties); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 75-79-21 (Supp. 1986) (Commissioner of Agriculture's hearing on denial of license for pulpwood receiving
facility); Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-7-1 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (State Board of Banking Review's hearing on Bank-
ing Commissioner's denial of application for branch bank); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-49-11 (Supp. 1986) (Insur-
ance Commissioner's hearing on revocation of license to sell legal expense insurance); Miss. COD ANN. §
89-12-39 (Supp. 1986) (state treasurer's hearing on denial of claim upon abandoned property).
42. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-1 to -21 (Supp. 1986).
43. Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 1-102 Commentary at 80 (1981).
44. MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-43-3(b) (Supp. 1986).
45. See, e.g., Insurance Comm'n v. Savery, 204 So. 2d 278 (Miss. 1967). For examples of such penalties,
see Miss. CODE ANN. § 7-7-59 (Supp. 1986) (establishing a reasonable petty cash fund for each state agency
and levying a civil penalty for violation of this section); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7-9-12 (Supp. 1986) (authorizing
the state treasurer to establish clearing accounts and bank accounts necessary to facilitate the deposit, collec-
tion, investment and disbursement of state funds and also levying a civil penalty for violation of this section);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-9-41 (Supp. 1986) (providing that coal exploration activities which disturb the natural
land surface in violation of this section shall be subject to the penalties in H6 53-9-55 to -59 and 8 53-9-63);
Miss. CODE ANN. 8 69-9-7 (1972) (soybean purchasers who fail to file a report or to pay an assessment within
the time required by the State Tax Commission shall forfeit a prescribed penalty); Miss. CODE ANN. 8 73-21-103
(Supp. 1986) (delineating penalties for violation of provisions governing pharmacists); Miss. CODE ANN. §
73-39-19 (Supp. 1986) (delineating penalties for violations of provisions governing veterinarians or certified
animal technicians); Miss. CooE ANN. § 75-31-335 (1972) (delineating procedure in event of milk product
law violations; authorizing treble damages); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-45-181 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (delineating
penalties for violations of the Mississippi Commercial Feed Law of 1972).
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VI. BUDGETING
In this decade, state agencies have been operating within se-
vere budgeting restraints. Revenue shortfalls in four of the last
five years have resulted in reductions of agency budgets and
recommendations of eliminating some agency programs."' These
budgetary constraints have affected agency capacity to conduct
hearings. 7 One of the features of a central panel system would
be the reduction of the overall cost of administrative hearings.
There is a paucity of research on the budgetary impact of a cen-
tral panel, but the experiences of two central panel states indicate
a substantial savings. 8
Two approaches are used to fund the operation of a central panel
system: a general fund appropriation and a revolving fund assess-
ment. 9 Under the general fund approach, the central panel receives
an appropriation from the general fund, and agencies use the cen-
tral panel services as needed at no cost to the agencies. Under
the revolving fund approach, the central panel assesses or bills
each agency for the services actually used by that agency. Each
agency includes a separate line item expense for central panel serv-
ices in its budget.
At least three states use a revolving fund assessment to fund
the central panel system.5" The major weakness of the revolving
fund approach is that the central panel budget is dependent upon
the extent of use by the agencies. The administrative law judges
of the central panel may perceive that unfavorable rulings will
result in less usage by agencies. Agencies may avoid use of the
central panel judges through use of informal proceedings and set-
tlement of cases. Thus the independence of the central panel and
the due process protection it is designed to provide would be com-
promised. Also, as a separate line item of expense in an agency
budget, the allocation for central panel services may be more sus-
ceptible to legislative cuts. An agency may place a low priority
on this allocation and reduce it, or more willingly accept a reduc-
46. JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE 1986 MISS. LEGISLATURE, BUDGET REPORT FOR FIs-
CAL YEAR 1987 at 17 (1986).
47. 1984 MISS. BD. OF NURSING ANN. REP. 8 (reported that the agency had held 92 hearings, had a backlog
of cases and requested the hiring of an additional investigator and a paralegal clerk to assist with subpoenas,
confessions, records and board actions).
49. Harves, Independenl Hearing Examiners - the Minnesota Experience, THE HENNasPI LAW'YER, May-
June 1980, at 26-27 (Minnesota); Silas, Eight States Set Pace in Setting Up Independent Administrative Law
Panels, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 18 (New Jersey).
49. For a discussion of the California system and the general background on these two approaches, see
g merally Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The California View, 29 Ad. L. Rev. 487 (1977).
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11370.4 (1980 & Supp. 1986) (specifying that the total cost shall be collected
from state agencies); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.53 (West Supp. 1986) ("Chief administrative law judge shall
assess agencies the cost of services rendered . . . ."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.130 (Supp. 1986)
(creating administrative hearings revolving fund).
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tion in this item in order to protect other program allocations.
We propose the use of a hybrid model, combining the general
fund and revolving fund approaches. This hybrid model allevi-
ates the weakness of the revolving fund approach and utilizes the
resources of general and special funds. The central panel would
receive funds from the general fund to conduct hearings for those
general fund agencies within its jurisdiction. This general fund
appropriation assures that the basic, or core, needs of the central
panel would be provided for and that the central panel would not
be solely dependent on the extent to which agencies use its
services.
In addition, the central panel should be authorized to assess spe-
cial fund agencies for the use of its services. Many of the special
fund agencies are small, specialized licensing and regulatory agen-
cies governed by part-time boards with annual budgets of less than
$500,000.51 These special funds are largely derived from fees and
assessments and are protected from across-the-board budget cuts. 2
These agencies probably have the greatest need for experienced
and impartial hearing officers. The central panel system would
provide these officers, and the pay-as-you-use approach of the
assessment fund would make it affordable and cost effective for
these agencies.
VII. AGENCY REVIEW OF DECISION
In addition to organizational separation and independence, other
means of negating institutional bias are essential. Impartiality
diminishes if the agency head is free to review, modify, or reject
the order of the administrative law judge. Yet, a feature common
to the Model Act and the central panel states is agency review
of the proposed order of the administrative law judge.5 3 Under
the Model Act, the agency, which is often a party, may review
the administrative law judge's initial order."4 The act also requires
that the initial order be a part of the record, with the differences
between the initial order and the agency's final order to be identi-
51. JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE 1986 Miss. LEGISLATURE, BUDGET REPORT FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 1987, at 289-364 (Part 2, Special Fund Agencies).
52. Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-104-13 (Supp. 1986) (protecting special funds from across-the-board cuts);
JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE t986 Miss. LEGtSLATURE, BUDGET REPOtT FOR FiSC&L YE&R
1987 at 17 (1986); Panel Slashes 25.5 Million, The Clarion Ledger, Jan. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
53. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-216(a) (1981); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-4-105 (1973 & Supp. 1985) (specifying procedures for review of an agency decision or initial determination
of a hearing officer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10 (West 1986); TENN. CODE §§ 4-5-314, 4-5-315 (1985
& Supp. 1986) (specifying procedure for review of initial order, but not expressly delineating review of order
of administrative law judge). The policy for agency review is to prevent the agency from losing its traditional
adjudicative function and to prevent a transfer of power to the administrative law judge. See generally, K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 10.07 (1972).
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fled. 5 Agency review may be eliminated by law."
California and Florida are indicative of the authority for agency
review found in the central panel states. In Florida, an agency
may modify or reject conclusions of law or interpretation of ad-
ministrative rules, but it may not reject or modify the findings
of fact, unless the agency determines that those findings were not
based on competent substantial evidence, or the proceedings did
not meet the essential requirements of law." In California, an
agency may adopt the proposed decision in its entirety or reduce
the penalty and adopt the balance of the decision. If the proposed
decision is rejected, then the agency may decide the case on the
record. 5
Although agency review is standard in central panel states, it
is an undesirable factor that should be eliminated. Agency review
reintroduces the institutional bias that the central panel was
designed to remove. The agency which is a party to the controversy
may be permitted to interfere in the adjudicative process. This
again provides an unhealthy union between the adjudicatory and
prosecutorial functions. The agency is allowed to switch roles from
that of zealous prosecutor to that of appellate judge of its own
cause. This veto power over the administrative law judge's deci-
sion creates a real bias against a contestant.
Relieving agency heads or boards of the burden of adjudica-
tion would permit them to devote their time and energy to their
fundamental task of defining and improving administrative policy.
They could focus on problem areas within their jurisdiction and
zealously defend their policies without the burden of also trying
to be fair judges in cases where their established policy is
challenged.
Allowing agencies to review the central panel's decisions would,
in effect, be assigning them a purely judicial function, which would
violate the separation of powers clause of our constitution. We
propose that agencies be given no power of review over central
panel decisions." The final order of the central panel hearing
officer should be made reviewable by a court of law, on the record
made at the central panel.
55. Id. at § 4-216(i).
56. Id. at § 4-216(a)(1).
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1)(i)(9) (Supp. 1986).
58. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11517(b)-(c) (Supp. 1986).
59. See Grossman and Mullen, Administrative Law Reform in New Jersey: The First Five Years of the OAL,
7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 153, 164-66 (1984). If the jurisdiction of the central panel includes ratemaking or
rulemaking, review by the agency may be appropriate.
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VIII. STATUTORY STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The concept of the central panel may be seen more clearly in
the context of the tripartite structure of our government. Although
administrative agencies have been described as the "fourth branch
of government," Mississippi government has but three branches.6"
The work of the central panel would be quasi-judicial in nature,
but it would be an executive branch entity exercising executive
powers.
The role of the legislature, beyond the establishment of the cen-
tral panel, would be to determine the standards to be applied by
the executive agencies.61 The key concept is that there should be
clearly defined standards, which are usually prescribed by legis-
lation."2 The authority to define standards could be delegated to
an agency,6" but whether enunciated by statute or regulation, stan-
dards would have to be clearly stated.6 The legislature would es-
tablish the structure of the central panel, assign it jurisdiction,
and provide it with legal standards to apply in hearing cases.
Within the four corners of that statutory charter, the panel would
perform fact-finding and apply standards (statutory and regula-
tory) to the facts before it."5
In courts, the record is built step by step before the hearing
ever takes place. This orderly procedure is usually not followed
in administrative proceedings. The entire record for appellate
review is usually made during the course of an evidentiary hear-
ing, but the record must be made in a manner that is comprehen-
sible for appellate review.66 A secondary yet major benefit of
having a central panel would be that well trained hearing officers
60. Miss. CONST. art. 1, § 1, 2; Alexander v. Allain, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Miss. 1983).
61. Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Medical Ass'n, 381 So. 2d 1046, 1050 (Miss. 1980); State v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 231 Miss. 869, 882, 97 So. 2d 372, 375 (1957).
62. Smith v. Ladner, 288 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D. Miss. 1968); State v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 Miss. 869,
882, 97 So. 2d 372, 375 (1957).
63. Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 779 (Miss. 1974) (suggesting that the authority to define standards
must be limited so as not to encroach upon the legislative prerogative).
64. Cohen v. M.S.U., 256 F. Supp. 954, 961 (N.D. Miss. 1966); Miss. Air & Water Pollution Control
Permit Bd. v. Pets & Such Foods, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Miss. 1981).
65. Farrish Gravel v. Miss. State Highway Comm'n, 458 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Miss. 1984); Strong v. Bostick,
420 So. 2d 1356, 1361 (Miss. 1982); Miss. Milk Comm'n v. Winn-Dixie, 235 So. 2d 684, 688 (Miss. 1970);
Broadhead v. Monaghan, 238 Miss. 239, 259, 117 So. 2d 881, 890 (1960). The court in Broadhead stated that
the Legislature may delegate to an administrative officer or agency power to enforce penalties
prescribed by the Legislature ... without resort to the courts. Due process does not require
that the courts, rather than administrative officers, be charged .. .with determining the facts
upon which the imposition of such a penalty depends.
Id.
66. State Bd. of Psychological Examiners v. Coxe, 355 So. 2d 669, 671 (Miss. 1978).
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would build a complete record for judicial review.67 Where there
is no adequate administrative remedy, courts must hold a full
evidentiary hearing rather than a simple review of the adminis-
trative record. 68
The central panel would sit on that important frontier where
the executive and judicial branches touch upon each others' realms
of responsibility. The adoption of a central panel would better
define the relationship between the courts and the agencies within
the panel's jurisdiction. The Mississippi Supreme Court has repeat-
edly announced that reviewing courts should not second-guess fact-
finding by administrative bodies.69 By this rule, reviewing courts
are bound to apply the law in light of facts found at the hearing,
with their review limited to a search for errors of law. "Our Con-
stitution does not permit the judiciary of this state to retry de novo
matters on appeal from administrative agencies. Our courts are
not permitted to make administrative decisions and perform the
functions of an administrative agency." o
In Mississippi, the settled rule for appellate review of adminis-
trative decisions is for the court to determine whether the agency's
decision
(1) was not supported by substantial evidence;
(2) was arbitrary or capricious;
(3) was beyond the power of the administratrive agency to make;
or
(4) violated some statutory or constitutional right of the
complaining party. "
Although the legislature could codify or modify these grounds,72
we propose no change in these standards of review. However,
67. Cases within the jurisdiction of the central panel could not be litigated prior to the hearing at the central
panel, but would enter the courts as an appeal on the record. Davis v. Barr, 250 Miss. 54, 63, 157 So. 2d
505, 508 (1963) (noting that "where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought
by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act"), clarified, 250 Miss. 73, 73-74, 163 So. 2d 745, 745-46
(1964), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 965 (1964). Id. at 63, 157 So. 2d at 508. The central panel would, in proper
cases, entertain motions for rehearing or reconsideration. Geiger v. Miss. State Board of Cosmetology, 246
Miss. 542, 547, 151 So. 2d 189, 191 (1963).
68. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc. v. J. & G. Express, Inc., 244 Miss. 427, 440, 141 So. 2d 720, 726
(1962).
69. Miss. State Tax Comm'n v. Miss.-Ala. State Fair, 222 So. 2d 664, 665 (1969).
70. Bd. of Trustees of Pass Christian v. Acker, 326 So. 2d 799, 801 (Miss. 1976); Miss. State Tax Comm'n
v. Miss.-Ala. State Fair, 222 So. 2d 664, 665 (Miss. 1969); accord Lofton v. George County, 183 So. 2d
621, 622-23 (Miss. 1966); Cal. Co. v. State Oil and Gas Bd. 200 Miss. 824, 841-45, 27 So. 2d 542, 546-47
(1946), affd on rehearing, 200 Miss. 847, 849, 28 So. 2d 120, 121 (1946). But see Knox v. L.N. Dantzler
Lumber Co., 148 Miss. 834, 854, 114 So. 873, 877 (1927) ("[V]aluation of property for assessment is a judi-
cial act . . . ."). Id. at 854, 114 So. at 877.
71. Mainstream Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Washington Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 325 So. 2d 902,
903 (Miss. 1976); Miss. State Tax Comm'n v. Miss.-Ala. State Fair, 222 So. 2d 664, 665 (Miss. 1969).
72. See, e.g., Miss. CooE ANN. §§ 25-9-132 and 37-9-113 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (specifying the standard
-of review for public employee appeals and review of teacher dismissals). Mississippi common law on judicial
review of administrative decisions is consistent with the standards outlined in the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act.
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this standard of judicial review is a deferential one. Thus it is in-
cumbent upon the legislative and executive branches to ensure
that the process to which the courts are deferring is worthy of
the standard.
We recommend the circuit, rather than the chancery court as
the forum for judicial review of the central panel's final order.
This is the appropriate court in our constitutional scheme.73
IX. CONCLUSION
In summary, the adoption of a central panel system for Missis-
sippi's administrative law judges would substantially increase the
fairness of the quasi-judicial aspects of our administrative process.
This approach has been tried in other states, and it works well.
Agencies that have prosecutorial functions would be unshackled
from the burden of trying to provide a fair hearing while at the
same time trying to enforce the law. The central panel, once
established, would be a flexible basis for future legislation to build
upon. The central panel would cost less to operate than the scores
of tribunals that must be periodically convened under our current
law. Most importantly, its adoption would preserve the appear-
ance and the reality of fairness, enhance the credibility of the ad-
ministrative process, and generate "the feeling, so important to
a popular government, that justice has been done." 7
73. MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 156. But see Western Line Consol. School Dist. v. City of Greenville, 465
So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Miss. 1985) (appeal of reasonableness of annexation is a question for equity jursidiction
which is properly assigned to chancery court); Charter Medical Corp. v. Miss. Health Planning and Dev. Agency,
362 So. 2d 180, 182 (Miss. 1978) (chancery court has jurisdiction for review of decision of state board where
there is no adequate remedy at law).
74 Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951).
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